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At the European Council meeting on 15 
December 2017, the EU27 Member States 
agreed that the negotiations on the UK’s 
withdrawal could move onto the second 
phase.  
Since the result of the EU referendum, my 
Committee has closely scrutinised the 
implications of EU withdrawal for Scotland. 
As part of that process, we have learnt what 
it means to be a Member of the EU. Now, 
we will be learning what it means to be a 
third country as we start to negotiate the 
framework for our future relationship. 
I hope that this report, undertaken for the 
Committee by Dr Tobias Lock of Edinburgh 
Law School, will help to clarify and promote 
a wider understanding of the very complex 
processes that lie ahead. Its publication is 
particularly timely in light of the agreement 
of the guidelines adopted at the December 
European Council meeting. 
The European Council guidelines set out the position of the Member States in relation to 
phase two: 
 Phase two of the negotiations can only progress as long as the commitments from 
phase one are fully respected and translated faithfully into a legal text; 
  
 There can be a transition of around two years with the UK continuing to participate in 
the customs union and single market, respect the four freedoms, adopt new EU law 
and accept the existing regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and 
enforcement instruments and structures. 
 
 If the UK provides further clarity on its position on the future framework, then 
preliminary and preparatory discussions can start after March with the aim of 
identifying an overall understanding, which will be elaborated in a political declaration 
to accompany the Withdrawal Agreement. 
 
 An agreement on a future relationship can only be finalised and concluded when the 
UK has become a third country. 
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Dr Lock’s report sets out the legal and political constraints in which the future negotiations 
will take place. He explains the legal bases and the procedures for the Withdrawal 
Agreement, the transitional arrangements and the future relationship in some detail. His 
report will provide a valuable resource for my Committee as we scrutinise the next steps 
and their implications for Scotland, and I hope that it will help to dispel many of the 
misunderstandings about the process ahead.  
Dr Lock’s report shows that reaching the end-point that the UK Government seeks of being 
outside the single market and the customs union, but with a deep and comprehensive 
trading relationship with the EU, will be a long, complex and potentially fraught process.   
Joan McAlpine MSP 
 
 
 
 
 
Convener 
Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Relations Committee 
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Tobias Lock is a Senior Lecturer in EU Law at 
Edinburgh Law School and co-director of the 
Europa Institute.  His research interest lies 
broadly speaking in the EU’s multilevel 
relations with other legal orders. His main 
focus is on courts as frontline actors in this 
legal environment.  
He has published two books on the relations 
between the European Court of Justice and 
international courts and has done much work 
on the relationship between the EU and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in 
particular the EU’s accession to the 
Convention.   
Of late, Tobias' research has been dominated 
by the many legal questions surrounding 
'Brexit'.  He is a regular speaker at academic 
conferences and public-facing events and has 
given oral and written evidence to numerous 
parliamentary enquiries in Westminster, 
Holyrood, and Cardiff.   
He is part of the Civil Society Brexit Project, which aims to give information, insight and 
independent advice to make sure that organisations in Scotland are able to influence Brexit 
as much as possible.  He is also a founding member of the Scottish Universities Legal 
Network on Europe (SULNE). 
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When negotiating the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and a future relationship with it, the 
European Union is acting under considerable legal and political constraints.  The legal 
constraints stem from the fact that the EU only has limited powers and – without including 
the Member States as parties – can only tie itself to an agreement that falls within its 
competences.  There are additional political constraints on the EU’s negotiator, who is 
confined by the negotiating guidelines set by the European Council and by the negotiating 
directives formulated by the Council.  Furthermore, the ratification of both the withdrawal 
agreement and an agreement about the future relationship requires the consent of the 
European Parliament. 
Additional pressures are caused by the tight time-frame of two years for the conclusion of a 
withdrawal agreement, which will end on 29 March 2019.  If no withdrawal agreement is 
concluded, the UK will leave the EU without a deal on that day, unless the two year period 
is extended unanimously.  But even if a withdrawal agreement is concluded in time, there 
may not be enough time to also come to a final agreement – including ratification – over the 
future relationship in terms of trade, security, and other forms of cooperation.  This makes a 
transition period, which will see the UK outside the EU, but still partake in most EU policies 
including the single market and customs union, a practical necessity. 
A withdrawal agreement based on Article 50 TEU can, in all likelihood, also include 
transitional arrangements provided that these arrangements are truly transitional and do not 
become permanent.  A transitional arrangement will – as far as possible – aim to replicate 
the UK’s current status in the EU while allowing the UK to formally leave on 29 March 2019.  
The UK will probably have to agree to be bound by the full EU acquis and the EU’s 
enforcement mechanisms including oversight by the Court of Justice, but will no longer 
have a role in the EU’s decision-making processes. 
As far as the future relationship is concerned, there are a number of avenues the EU and 
the UK could pursue: a free trade agreement (the ‘Canada model’), an association 
agreement (the ‘Ukraine model’); a set of bilateral agreements replicating much of the 
single market (the ‘Swiss model’); or membership of the European Economic Area (the 
‘Norway model’), but it should be noted the only pre-negotiated route is the Norway model.  
All other models are unlikely to be replicated in their exact details due to the unique 
circumstances and dynamics of each treaty negotiation process.  It should further be noted 
that EU-UK relationship is also envisaged to cover fields other than trade, in particular 
security cooperation.  While the EU has far-reaching external competences covering most if 
not all of these matters, it is likely that the EU Member States will insist on the future 
relationship agreement being concluded as a mixed agreement.  This will require ratification 
of the agreement not only by the EU and the UK, but by all the EU-27 as well.  
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Following the United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union that it wishes to withdraw from the European Union, the negotiations have so far 
been focused on the first phase of the Article 50 TEU Withdrawal Agreement. 
The European Council Guidelines and Council Negotiating Directives include a phased 
approach to the negotiations, with the first phase aiming to settle the disentanglement of the 
UK from the EU. On the basis of a joint report drafted by the EU and UK negotiators, on 8 
December 2017 the European Commission recommended to the European Council that 
sufficient progress had been made to move to the second phase.  On 15 December 2017, 
the European Council followed the Commission’s recommendation, so that the second 
phase of negotiations can commence.  It will be dedicated to finalising some questions left 
open in the first phase, the negotiation of a transitional arrangement, and an agreement on 
the basic contours of the future relationship between the EU and the UK.  The latter will be 
negotiated and concluded during a transition phase after the UK has left the EU.  
This briefing paper provides an overview of these  next steps in the negotiating process: the 
negotiation and conclusion of a withdrawal agreement; of a transitional arrangement; and of 
a final agreement on the future relations between the EU and the UK.   
The briefing demonstrates that the process of withdrawal from the European Union is as 
much a legal process as it is a political process.   
It sets out the legal bases for each of these procedures to the extent that it is possible and 
makes reference to what might be politically achievable.   
After outlining legal, political, and time constraints under which the withdrawal negotiations 
are being conducted, this briefing will consider the following specific issues in more detail:  
 The legal basis and procedure for the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement and a 
discussion of what an “overall understanding on the framework for the future 
relationship” might look like.   
 
 A discussion of what form a transitional agreement following the UK’s departure from 
the EU might take, in particular whether the scope of Article 50 TEU is sufficiently 
broad for the conclusion of a transitional agreement and the length of time for which 
such an agreement could be legally competent. In addition, the briefing will briefly 
outline what might the impact of a transitional agreement be on the UK domestic 
process of leaving the EU. 
 
 An explanation of the process for agreeing a treaty (or several treaties) governing 
the future relationship between the UK and the EU. 
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Following the EU referendum of 23 June 2016, the Prime Minister notified the President of 
the European Council on 29 March 2017 of the United Kingdom’s (UK) intention to withdraw 
from the European Union (EU).  This notification – sent in accordance with Article 50 (2) 
TEU1 – set into motion a process requiring the EU and the UK to conclude a withdrawal 
agreement within a two-year time-frame.  Failing this, the UK will cease to be a Member 
State without such an agreement, unless the UK and the European Council – i.e. the heads 
of state and government of all Member States, the president of the EU Commission and the 
European Council’s own president acting by way of consensus – agree that the negotiating 
period should be extended.  It follows that in the absence of an extension the EU and the 
UK have until 29 March 2019 to conclude and ratify a withdrawal agreement. 
According to Article 50 (2) TEU, it is the purpose of the withdrawal agreement to set out ‘the 
arrangements for [the departing Member State’s] withdrawal’. As explained in more detail 
below, the agreement is therefore mainly intended to deal with the technical arrangements 
for withdrawal and the legacy of the UK’s EU membership.  As the Prime Minister and other 
ministers have made clear on numerous occasions – notably in the Prime Minister’s 
Florence speech of 22 September 20172 – the UK would like to remain a close partner of 
the EU.  In order to achieve this, the Prime Minister envisages that the UK ‘would seek to 
secure a new, deep and special partnership with the European Union.’3 
It is widely accepted that such a new partnership – encompassing trade, security, and other 
forms of cooperation – would have to be founded on one or more international agreements 
between the EU and the UK.4   
The EU has international legal personality5 and has concluded a large number of 
international agreements with non-Member States.  When negotiating and concluding such 
agreements, however, the EU operates under tight legal constraints.   
The main constraint stems from the fact that the EU is not a sovereign entity, but that it only 
possesses those competences that the Member States have conferred upon it.6  This 
means that its powers to conclude international agreements are limited to certain policy 
areas.  For instance, the EU has an exclusive competence to conclude agreements 
concerning the common commercial policy, i.e. trade agreements.7  By contrast, it has no 
                                            
1 Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/1 (hereafter TEU). 
2 Prime Minister Theresa May, ‘A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’, 
available at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-
partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Despite earlier writings suggesting that Article 50 TEU might serve as a basis, this now seems to be the 
general consensus in the literature (and also in practice), see Steve Peers and Darren Harvey, ‘Brexit: the 
legal dimension’, in: Catherine Barnard/Steve Peers (eds) European Union Law, 2nd edn, OUP 2017, 815, 
831. 
5 See Article 47 TEU. 
6 Articles 4 (1) and 5 (1) TEU. 
7 See Article 3 (1) (e) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (hereafter TFEU). 
The legal and political process for agreeing the future relationship                                                            
between the EU and the UK and any transitional agreement  
competence to conclude agreements on policy areas not governed by EU law, e.g. on 
maritime boundaries, and very little (co-called supporting) competence in fields such as 
healthcare or education.8  Where the EU does not have competence to conclude the entire 
agreement, the agreement must also be concluded by the Member States as a so-called 
mixed agreement.9 
A further limitation to what the EU can do stems from procedural constraints.  EU 
agreements are generally concluded by the Council – i.e. the relevant ministers of the 
Member States.  Depending on the type of agreement concluded, the Council must either 
agree unanimously or by qualified majority.10  Furthermore, the EU Treaties sometimes 
require the European Parliament’s consent, sometimes mere consultation of the European 
Parliament, and in some cases no involvement of the European Parliament.11  For instance, 
a withdrawal agreement concluded under Article 50 TEU must receive the consent of the 
European Parliament and be concluded with a qualified majority in the Council.12  If a mixed 
agreement is concluded, it must additionally be ratified by each Member State according to 
its constitutional requirements.  This often means a ratification process involving the 
national parliament, and may in some instances include a need for ratification by regional 
parliaments as well.  Mixed agreements are therefore more time-consuming to conclude 
and encounter more potential hurdles. 
The EU cannot choose to ignore these constraints.  Not only would this run counter to its 
self-understanding as being founded on the basis of the rule of law, but it would also make 
any agreement concluded in violation of these limits liable to being declared incompatible 
with the Treaties – and thus invalid – by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  The ECJ can 
be involved before the agreement is concluded – by way of a request for an opinion under 
Article 218 (11) TFEU – or at a later stage in the context of ‘regular’ adversarial 
proceedings. 
International agreements concluded by the European Union must be compatible with the 
EU Treaties.  This means that they must have been adopted using the correct competence 
base and procedure and that they must not run counter to other rules contained in the 
Treaties (e.g. respect for fundamental rights). 
The ECJ has the power to declare international agreements concluded by the EU 
incompatible with the EU Treaties.  There are two points in time at in which an EU 
agreement can become the subject of proceedings before the ECJ: before the conclusion of 
an agreement by way of a so-called ‘opinion’; and after its conclusion in the course of 
normal proceedings before the ECJ. 
 
                                            
8 For an indication of the fields covered by the EU’s supporting competences, see Article 6 TFEU. 
9 On mixed agreements in more detail, see below. 
10 See Article 218 (8) TFEU. 
11 In matters relating exclusively to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
12 Excluding the withdrawing Member State, see Article 50 (4). 
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Opinions 
According to Article 218 (11) TFEU the ECJ can be asked for an opinion ‘as to whether an 
agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties.’  This procedure aims to avoid a 
situation in which the EU has tied itself under international law by ratifying an international 
treaty even though according to its own internal rules it was not allowed to conclude it.  It 
can be initiated by each Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission.   
There is some discussion in the academic literature whether the withdrawal agreement 
based on Article 50 TEU – and by extension the transitional deal if it is based on Article 50 as 
well – could be the subject of such an opinion because Article 50 TEU does not make 
express reference to Article 218 (11) TFEU.  The majority of commentators seems to agree 
that this is possible.13  This would raise practical problems, however, as it takes the ECJ 
between 18 and 24 months on average to decide on an opinion.   
It is an open question whether the initiation of an opinion procedure would stop the 
Article 50-clock.  The main problem results from the fact that if an opinion were pending 
before the ECJ, the EU would not be able to conclude the withdrawal agreement.  If the 
two-year clock continued to tick, this would mean that the UK would leave the EU without 
an agreement.  For this reason some suggest that the initiation of the Article 50 procedure 
would in itself lead to the clock being paused.14  Others suggest, that this would not be the 
case.15  If the latter is true, the EU and the UK would need to agree to an extension of the 
negotiating period if they wanted to avoid a (temporary) no deal scenario. 
A similar issue could arise if the agreement on a future relationship is subjected to the same 
procedure if the transitional arrangement were time-limited. 
Other routes 
The withdrawal agreement (including any the transitional arrangement) and the 
agreement(s) on the future relationship between the EU and the UK will almost certainly 
give rise to litigation within the EU27.  This means that it is likely that they will also reach 
the ECJ, either by way of a request for a preliminary ruling from a national court or directly 
                                            
13 See Kenneth Armstrong, ‘Implementing Transition: Legal and Political Limits, University of Cambridge, 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No 50/2017, page 4; Jean-Claude Piris, ‘If the UK votes to 
leave: the seven alternatives to membership’, Centre for European Reform, January 2016, available at: 
www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2016/if-uk-votes-leave-seven-alternatives-eu-membership page 
6; Adam Łazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership’ (2012) 37 
European Law Review 523, 528; Christophe Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European 
Union’, in: Chalmers/Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, OUP 2015, 126, 141; Piet 
Eeckhout, Eleni Frantziou, ‘Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading’ (2017) 54 Common Market 
Law Review, 695, 731. 
14 Eeckhout/Frantziou, fn. 13, 731. 
15 See oral evidence of 21 November 2017 to the House of Lords EU Committee by Sir Konrad Schiemann, 
former judge of the ECJ (in the context of answering Q 4), available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/brexit-the-jurisdiction-of-the-cjeu/oral/74225.html. 
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by way of one of the other procedures envisaged in the TFEU.  While most of these cases 
will in all likelihood be concerned with the interpretation of the various provisions of the 
agreement concerned, they could also be used to challenge the validity of any agreement 
concluded by the EU.  This includes in particular arguments that the agreement was 
adopted on the wrong legal basis or by using the wrong procedure. 
It should be noted that the requirement in Article 218 (1) TFEU that agreements be 
concluded ‘with one or more third countries’ does not constitute a limitation on the EU’s 
ability to negotiate an agreement covering its future relationship with the UK while the UK is 
still a Member State.  It is not entirely clear, however, whether such an agreement can be 
concluded while the UK is still a Member State provided that it only takes effect with Brexit, 
i.e. at a point in time when the UK is a third country.  The European Council’s guidelines 
appear to suggest that the conclusion of such an agreement would have to wait until the UK 
is formally a third country, i.e. no longer a Member State.  But there are good reasons to 
suggest that this is too strict a reading and that Article 218 (1) 
TFEU merely prohibits such an agreement from entering into force while the country 
concerned is still in the EU.16 
The EU’s negotiator is further constrained by his negotiating mandate.  Article 50 (2) TEU 
makes it clear that the Union shall negotiate the withdrawal agreement in ‘light of the 
guidelines provided by the European Council’. These guidelines were formulated on 29 
April 2017 shortly after the UK’s notification of withdrawal. 17  As is usual practice for the 
negotiation of EU agreements,18 the Council coupled its negotiating mandate for the 
European Commission – required by Article 218 (3) TFEU to which Article 50 (2) TEU 
refers – with negotiating directives published on 22 May 2017.19 
The legal effect of these negotiating directives is limited.  They can probably be considered 
legally binding within the EU’s legal order, but this has no consequences for the validity of a 
withdrawal agreement concluded outside the limits set by them.  After all, the withdrawal 
agreement is concluded by the Council itself and the Council may certainly deviate from its 
own directives.  Notwithstanding their limited legal effects, the negotiating directives act as 
political constraints.  They are also an indication of what kind of agreement the Council 
would be prepared to accept.20  From the perspective of the UK this means that if it wishes 
to push the negotiations in a radically different direction from what is covered by the 
negotiating directives, this can only happen if new directives are adopted, i.e. with the 
political backing of the EU-27. 
                                            
16 See Eeckhout/Frantziou, fn. 13, 716; Andrew Duff, ‘After Brexit: A New Association Agreement Between 
Britain and Europe’, policy network paper, October 2016, available at: www.policy-
network.net/publications/6141/After-Brexit, page 13. 
17 European Council, Guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50, 29 April 2017, 
EUCO XT 20004/17. 
18 See Article 218 (4) TFEU according to which the Council ‘may address directives to the negotiator’. 
19 Council of the European Union, Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union of 
22 May 2017, XT 21016/17 ADD 1 REV 2. 
20 See Rudolf Mögele, Art. 218 AEUV, in: Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 2nd edn., C.H. Beck 2012.  
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It follows that the process of withdrawal from the European Union is as much a legal 
process as it is a political process.  The following sections on the withdrawal agreement, on 
a possible transitional or implementing period, and on agreement(s) on the future 
relationship will demonstrate this in more detail. 
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Article 50 TEU provides the legal basis for the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement. The 
relevant paragraph 2 reads as follows: 
A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
It is clear from the wording of Article 50 (2) TEU that the withdrawal agreement will be 
concluded between the EU (only) and the UK.  
Article 50 (2) TEU is an unusual provision in that it gives the EU a horizontal competence to 
deal with all matters of withdrawal.21  This means that the EU can enter binding 
commitments concerning all questions of withdrawal without – as would normally be 
required – the need for a specific competence base for the entirety of each policy area the 
agreement deals with.  This in turn means that the use of Article 50 (2) TEU as a legal basis 
cannot be unlimited.  This will be expanded upon in the next section on a possible 
transition. 
The Council – i.e. ministers of the 27 remaining EU Member States – must agree by 
qualified majority.  The qualified majority is calculated on the basis of this formula: 72% of 
the EU27 (i.e. 20 Member States) and 65% of their combined population.22  This means 
that no single Member State can veto the agreement at this stage.   
However, under Article 50 (2) TEU the Council can only conclude the agreement after 
having obtained the consent of the European Parliament, which therefore has a veto.  A 
simple majority in favour of the agreement would constitute consent.  The 72 UK MEPs are 
not excluded from the vote.23 
The requirement for the European Parliament’s consent has two practical implications: first, 
while Article 50 TEU does not expressly give the European Parliament a role in the 
negotiating process, there is a clear political incentive to involve it and it has a track record 
                                            
21 Fn. 19, para 5. 
22 See Article 50 (4) TEU and Article 238 (3) (b) TFEU. 
23 Darren Harvey, ‘What role for the European Parliament under article 50 TEU?’ (2017) 42 European Law 
Review 585, 599. 
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of exerting real influence on treaty negotiations.24  Second, the requirement for a prior 
involvement of the European Parliament adds to the time-pressure for negotiating a 
withdrawal agreement.  The European Parliament holds monthly plenary sessions, so that 
its consent can at the very latest be sought during the last session before 29 March 2019, 
which will presumably take place at some point in early to mid-March 2019. 
On 13 December 2017 the House of Commons voted in favour of an amendment to the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill reportedly giving ‘Parliament a legal guarantee of a vote 
on the final Brexit deal struck with Brussels’.25  This could be read as suggesting that the UK 
Parliament now has the same powers as the European Parliament, i.e. a right to veto 
ratification of the withdrawal agreement. 
On closer scrutiny, this conclusion does not seem accurate, however.  The amendment 
concerned clause 9 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which gives Ministers the 
power to implement the withdrawal agreement by way of secondary legislation (a so-called 
Henry VIII clause as it allows them to amend Acts of Parliament).  In its amended version the 
clause now reads: 
‘A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers 
appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement if the Minister 
considers that such provision should be in force on or before exit day, subject to the prior 
enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union’.26 
Technically, parliamentary approval is therefore only needed if the Government wanted to 
use the powers in clause 9 to implement the withdrawal agreement and – in contrast to the 
European Parliament’s role at EU level – not for its ability to conclude it as such.   
Implementation will of course remain necessary in order to make the withdrawal 
agreement work in practice, so that the amendment can be seen as an incentive for the 
Government to negotiate an agreement that is acceptable to Parliament.  According to the 
joint report, however, implementation may not be happen on the basis of clause 9 of the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, but by way of a new Withdrawal and Implementation 
Bill.27  Thus there is a question mark over whether clause 9 will ever need to be activated in 
                                            
24 Ibid, 595. 
25 BBC News, Brexit bill: Government loses key vote after Tory rebellion’ www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
42346192.  
26 Amendment highlighted by the author. 
27 Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress 
during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
European Union, TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, para 36 available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf the contents of this report are fleshed 
out by Commission Communication to the European Council on the state of progress of the negotiations with 
the United Kingdom, COM(2017)784 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/1_en_act_communication.pdf. 
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that way.28    Parliament will of course need to approve the new Bill and could refuse to do 
so if it disagreed with the substance of the withdrawal agreement.  This would, however, 
not change the fact that the Government could enter into an externally binding agreement 
with the EU without prior parliamentary approval. 
But even if Parliament were asked, timing would be a major concern.  As Elliot has pointed 
out, if close to the 29 March 2019 deadline Parliament ‘were to refuse to approve a 
withdrawal agreement that it considered deficient, it would be choosing a chaotic Brexit 
over a less-than-ideal Brexit’.29 
As far as the withdrawal negotiations are concerned, the European Council’s guidelines 
provide for a phased approach.30  The purpose of the first phase was intended ‘to provide 
as much clarity and legal certainty as possible to citizens, businesses, stakeholders and 
international partners’ on Brexit and to ‘settle the disentanglement of the United Kingdom 
from the Union’.   
On 15 December 2017 the European Council decided consensually31 that ‘sufficient 
progress’ had been achieved during the first phase of withdrawal negotiations.  It adopted 
new guidelines for the second phase of negotiations.32  During the second phase, the 
negotiators will need to complete the work on all withdrawal issues, including those not yet 
addressed (or left open) in the first phase.  Furthermore, the second phase will address 
transitional arrangements as well as an overall understanding on the framework for the 
future relationship between the EU and the UK.   
In keeping with Article 50 (2) TEU, the thrust of the withdrawal agreement will be to set out 
the arrangements for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.  It will thus deal with the legacy of 
the UK’s EU membership.  The key issues to be determined can be found in the Council’s 
negotiating directives, which defines as its main objective ‘to ensure an orderly 
withdrawal’.33  The basic contours of what has been agreed between the EU and the UK on 
these matters, can be found in the joint report of 8 December 2017.34 
                                            
28 See Kenneth Armstrong, ‘Parliament Takes Back Control … or Does It’, Brexit time, 13 December 2017, 
available at: https://brexittime.com/2017/12/13/parliament-takes-back-control-or-does-it/.  
29 Mark Elliot, ‘Does the Government defeat on clause 9 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill mean Parliament has 
“taken back control”?’, Public Law for Everyone, 14 December 2017, available at: 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/12/14/does-the-government-defeat-on-clause-9-of-the-eu-withdrawal-
bill-mean-parliament-has-taken-back-control/.  
30 Fn. 17, paras 4-6. 
31 The European Council always decides by way of consensus, see Article 15 (4) TEU. 
32 European Council, Guidelines of 15 December 2017, EUCO XT 20011/17, available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32236/15-euco-art50-guidelines-en.pdf.  
33 See fn. 19. 
34 Joint report (fn. 27). 
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 Citizens’ rights: the rights of EU27 citizens resident in the UK and UK citizens resident in 
the EU27.35 
 Financial settlement.36 
 Availability of goods placed on the market before the withdrawal date. 
 Ongoing judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. 
 Ongoing Union administrative and judicial procedures. 
 Ongoing judicial and police cooperation. 
 Further issues including EU property and assets in the UK; the fate of UK nationals 
employed by the EU; the phasing out of the UK’s participation in EU programmes, such as 
Horizon 2020; questions relating to Euratom; the UK’s sovereign bases in Cyprus, etc. 
 Governance of the agreement, in particular how it should be enforced, including what 
role the ECJ will play in this regard.  
The agreement will also need to stipulate the date of its entry into force, which determines 
the day the UK leaves the EU.37 
Both the European Council guidelines as well as the Council’s negotiating directives 
mention the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland.  An agreement on questions 
concerning the Irish border proved to be the main hurdle to ‘sufficient progress’ in the first 
phase of the withdrawal negotiations.38  As questions concerning the Irish border are mainly 
concerned with the need for customs inspections and other checks on goods crossing that 
border, they can only be properly addressed in the second phase and only be ultimately 
resolved in the negotiations on the future relationship between the EU and the UK.  The 
joint report of 8 December 2017 therefore only mentions the basic principles, but states 
expressly that they ‘must be upheld in all circumstances irrespective of the nature of any 
future agreement.’39  The UK has committed to avoiding a ‘hard border’ – an undefined term 
– and ‘any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements.’40 
Both the EU and the UK stress that in regard of the withdrawal agreement ‘nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed.’41  This means that the agreement secured on 8 
December 2017 can still be undone if both sides fail to agree an overall withdrawal deal.  At 
                                            
35 Details in joint report (fn. 27) paras 6-41. 
36 It seems that the UK will not be asked to agree to pay a lump sum, but instead make annual payments ‘as if 
the UK had remained a member state’, see joint report (fn. 27) paras 59-60.  
37 See Article 50 (3) TEU. 
38 The Council’s negotiating directives require that ‘nothing in the agreement should undermine the objectives 
of the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts and its related implementing agreements.’  Furthermore:  
‘Negotiations should in particular aim to avoid the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland, while 
respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. Full account should be taken of the fact that Irish citizens 
residing in Northern Ireland will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens. Existing bilateral agreements and 
arrangements between Ireland and the United Kingdom, such as the Common Travel Area, which are in 
conformity with EU law, should be recognised. The Agreement should also address issues arising from 
Ireland’s unique geographic situation, including transit of goods (to and from Ireland via the United Kingdom). 
See Council of the EU, fn. 13, para 14. 
39 Joint report (fn. 27) para 46. 
40 Ibid, para 49. 
41 Ibid, para 5. 
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the same time, the European Council made it clear that ‘negotiations in the second phase 
can only progress [i.e. result in a final withdrawal agreement] as long as all commitments 
undertaken during the first phase are respected in full and translated faithfully into legal 
terms as quickly as possible.’  This shows that while the agreement of 8 December 2017 – 
as laid down in the joint report – is not strictly legally binding, the EU regards it as a 
politically binding commitment and made it clear that it would not agree to a withdrawal 
agreement, unless the terms of the joint report were incorporated in it.42 
Article 50 (2) TEU stipulates that the withdrawal agreement should be concluded ‘taking 
account of the framework for [the UK’s] future relationship with the Union.’  This phrase 
entails both an objective for the withdrawal agreement as well as a limit to what it can 
achieve.   
By taking account of the framework for the UK’s future relationship, the terms of withdrawal 
should a) not stand in the way of achieving that future relationship; and b) ideally help to 
pave the way towards achieving it.  For instance, if the future relationship foresaw the 
continued participation of the UK in the Erasmus programme, it would – if practically 
possible – make sense for the withdrawal agreement not to completely phase out the UK 
from it in order to then reinstate it as a party. 
At the same time, despite being rather open-ended43 the wording of Article 50 (2) TEU limits 
the use of this provision as a competence basis.  It is difficult to conceive of it being used as 
the basis for a future relationship treaty.44  Otherwise, the more specific external 
competences scattered throughout the Treaties and the procedure foreseen in Article 218 
TFEU could be circumvented.45 
Hence if the terms of withdrawal were to be laid down in the same agreement as the future 
relationship – which due to the phasing of negotiations is unlikely – it would need to be 
based on additional external powers found in other provisions of the Treaties.46 
There is no indication as regards the level of detail and there is certainly nothing to prevent 
the drafters of the withdrawal agreement from resorting to very general or even trivial aims.  
Equally, a detailed list of common objectives or principles should be compatible with 
Article 50 (2) TEU.  It would only become problematic if the level of detail were such as to 
place the agreement outside the competence conferred on the EU by Article 50 (2) TEU.   
The European Council’s guidelines of April 2017 indicate what the EU-side to the 
negotiations has in mind.  They suggest that ‘an overall understanding on the framework for 
the future relationship should be identified during a second phase of the negotiations.’47  
                                            
42 See European Council (fn. 32) para 1. 
43 Paul Craig, ‘Brexit: a drama in six acts’ (2016) 41 European Law Review, 447, 465. 
44 See also Eeckhout/Frantziou, fn. 13, 715; but not that precisely the opposite seems to be implied in a pre-
referendum piece by Piris, fn. 13, page 9. 
45 See also: Bruno de Witte, ‘Near-membership, partial membership and the EU constitution’ (2016) 41 
European Law Review, 471. 
46 Eeckhout/Frantziou, fn. 13, 715; on these other legal bases see below. 
47 See fn. 17, para 5. 
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The European Council envisages that the framework will be elaborated in a political 
declaration and referred to in the withdrawal agreement.48   
Hence the future framework is likely to broadly outline the areas of future cooperation and 
in particular the type of trading relationship envisage, i.e. which ‘model’ should broadly 
speaking be followed.49   
The future relationship will also provide an important reference point for any transitional 
arrangement.  As the European Council guidelines of 15 December show, second phase of 
the withdrawal negotiations will also be used to make arrangements for a transition period.  
A key question in this regard is whether a transitional arrangement can be included in the 
withdrawal agreement and be based on Article 50 TEU.  This is discussed in the following 
section alongside other questions concerning a possible transitional arrangement. 
  
                                            
48 See European Council (fn 32) para 6. 
49 On the different models, see below. 
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Both sides of the withdrawal negotiations seem to agree that a change from EU 
membership to a permanent new relationship between the EU and the UK should not 
happen overnight on 29 March 2019.  Instead, both sides assume the need for a 
transitional arrangement – in EU diction – or an implementation phase – in UK diction.   
A transition deal is not a legal necessity. It is conceivable that a withdrawing Member State 
moves from membership to a new arrangement for its relationship with the EU within the 
two years envisaged by Article 50 TEU.  In this connection it is interesting to note that 
Article 50 TEU does not expressly mention transition as an option and that most 
commentators writing before 2016 did not consider it at all. 
Transition has, however, transpired to be a practical necessity, at least in the specific 
context of Brexit.  The rationales respectively given for transition by the EU-side and the 
UK-side differ slightly, which explains the difference in the terminology used.  While the 
European Council guidelines and Council negotiating directives stress the need for ‘bridges 
towards the foreseeable framework for the future relationship’,50 the Prime Minister 
emphasised in her two major Brexit speeches the need for ‘a phased process of 
implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for 
the new arrangements that will exist between us will be in our mutual self-interest. This will 
give businesses enough time to plan and prepare for those new arrangements’.51   
The difference in viewpoints is clear: from the EU’s perspective a transition is needed to 
allow for more time to negotiate and finalise an agreement about the future relationship 
whereas the UK’s point of view seems to be that such a future relationship would have 
already been agreed on exit day, but that some time would be needed to ratify it and make 
internal arrangements to avoid disruptions. 
Given the time-pressures of the negotiations with the two-year period coming to an end on 
29 March 2019 and given the average time it takes the EU to negotiate and ratify free trade 
agreements, it seems realistic to assume that a final deal on the future relationship between 
the EU and the UK cannot be agreed by 29 March 2019.  In any event, the European 
Council has made it clear that it is not willing to do so before the UK has formally become a 
third country, i.e. before the UK has left the EU.52 
Hence this paper assumes that a transition phase will have two broad objectives: first, to 
allow for detailed negotiations of a future relationship deal without there being an interim 
period during which there would be no special relationship between the EU and the UK on 
trade and other matters of cooperation.  Provided that the political declaration 
accompanying the withdrawal agreement outlines the future framework in at least broad 
                                            
50 European Council (fn 17) para 6; and Council of the EU (fn 19) para 19. 
51 See the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech ‘The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the 
EU’, 17 January 2017, available at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-
objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech; this was repeated in her Florence speech, fn. 2.  
52 See European Council (fn. 32) para 6. 
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brushstrokes, second, to allow time for government, businesses, and individuals to make 
practical preparations for the new relationship.  This is often described as the avoidance of 
a cliff-edge, in particular in terms of customs arrangements and other trade issues.  
However, it should be pointed out that a cliff-edge cannot be avoided entirely.  There will 
come a point in time when the EU-UK trade relationship (and other relationships) will 
change.  The objective of a transition can therefore only be the avoidance of sudden 
change without preparation. 
Negotiations have not yet progressed to questions of transition, which the EU was only 
prepared to discuss in the second phase of the withdrawal negotiations.  While the Council 
is expected to formulate detailed negotiating directives in January 2018, the European 
Council has already made clear that it envisages a ‘status quo’ transition.  A status quo 
transition is motivated by the consideration that if transition meant significant changes to the 
status quo, it would partly defeat its own purpose to buy time to negotiate and adapt to the 
future relationship.  After all it would probably require lengthy negotiations followed by an 
adaptation to the transitional arrangement only to then allow for further adaptation to the 
future relationship.   
The European Council said in its guidelines of 15 December 2017: 
‘In order to ensure a level playing field based on the same rules applying throughout the 
Single Market, changes to the acquis adopted by EU institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies will have to apply both in the United Kingdom and the EU. All existing Union 
regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures 
will also apply, including the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. As 
the United Kingdom will continue to participate in the Customs Union and the Single Market 
(with all four freedoms) during the transition, it will have to continue to comply with EU trade 
policy, to apply EU customs tariff and collect EU customs duties, and to ensure all EU 
checks are being performed on the border vis-à-vis other third countries.’53 
If this is agreed, it means that the UK will formally leave the EU on 29 March 2019, but that 
it will remain bound by EU law as if it were a Member State.  In contrast to a Member State, 
the UK would not be able to participate in the EU decision-making processes, but remain 
bound by them.  The UK would remain subject to enforcement procedures initiated by the 
European Commission (which may end up before the Court of Justice) and UK courts will 
remain in a position to request preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice.   
The European Council’s guidelines do not seem to cater for a phased approach to 
transition, which would see the UK leave certain policy areas over time.  It equally provides 
                                            
53 See European Council (fn. 32) para 4; this chimes with the European Council’s original guidelines of April 
2017 (fn 17) - echoed verbatim in Council of the EU (fn 19) para 19 – and demands by the European 
Parliament that ‘such a transition can only happen on the basis of the existing European Union regulatory, 
budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures’ and ‘that such a transitional 
period, when the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State, can only be the continuation of the whole of 
the acquis communautaire which entails the full application of the four freedoms (free movement of citizens, 
capital, services and goods), and that this must take place without any limitation on the free movement of 
persons through the imposition of any new conditions; stresses that such a transitional period can only be 
envisaged under the full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, see European Parliament, 
Resolution of 3 October 2017 on the state of play of negotiations with the United Kingdom, 2017/2847(RSP). 
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that the UK would remain bound to comply with the EU’s trade policy.  For EU Member 
States this mean that they must not engage in trade negotiations with third countries.  This 
flows from their duty of loyal cooperation with the EU.54  Whether the same restriction would 
apply to the UK during transition is yet unclear.  While the UK cannot allow a trade 
agreement with a third party to enter into force if that would undermine its obligations during 
transition – e.g. in regard to customs tariffs or product standards – one can make an 
argument that the UK need not necessarily be bound by the duty to abstain from 
negotiating such agreements during transition.  In fact, there may be a practical need to do 
so where the continued participation of the UK in EU trade agreements in concerned.55 
The UK Government has been more cautious on the substantive content of the transition, 
however.  Judging from evidence given by the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU to the 
House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee, there seems to be acceptance as regards 
the continuation of free movement of people as well as the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice.56  This points to a preparedness to accept a status quo transition. 
An important question will be in how far the UK will be required to abide by new EU 
legislation passed during the transition period or whether a status quo transition means that 
the UK’s rights and obligations will continue as they were on 29 March 2019. 
The UK Government agrees with the EU institutions that the transition period should be 
time-limited.  In her Florence speech the Prime Minister indicated that it should take ‘around 
two years.’  This is echoed in the European Council’s guidelines of 15 December 2017.57  
As will be argued below, a time-limit can be considered legally necessary for a transition 
period to be based on Article 50 TEU. 
The following discussion on how a transitional arrangement can be agreed in legal terms 
proceeds on the basis that such a transition would aim to result in as little deviation from the 
status quo as possible.   
It should first be pointed out that from a purely legal perspective there are two simple ways 
of achieving the objectives of a transitional or implementation period without much difficulty.  
The first would be to extend the two-year negotiating period according to Article 50 (3) TEU.  
This would require the consent of the UK and unanimity in the Council (i.e. the EU-27).  The 
second way of achieving the aims of transition would be to conclude and ratify the 
withdrawal agreement by 29 March 2019, but agree that it should only enter into force after 
two years (or whatever period of transition is considered appropriate).  This would then 
afford both parties additional time to negotiate an agreement on the future relationship 
between them and allow all those concerned to prepare for it in light of the framework for a 
future relationship laid down in the withdrawal treaty. 
                                            
54 Found in Article 4 (3) TEU. 
55 See below. 
56 See transcript of oral evidence given by David Davis on 25 October 2017, HC 372, available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/exiting-the-european-
union-committee/the-progress-of-the-uks-negotiations-on-eu-withdrawal/oral/72017.html (especially answers 
to questions 5 and 10). 
57 European Council (fn. 32) para 3. 
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Both options would achieve the objective of retaining the status quo for a limited period of 
time as the UK would continue to be a Member State of the EU beyond 29 March 2019.  It 
is recognised, however, that therein lies the political problem and it may therefore not be 
acceptable to the UK (or indeed the EU) to remain in the EU beyond that date.   
For these reasons a transitional arrangement would need to a) allow the UK to formally 
leave the EU on 29 March 2019; but b) retain as much of the UK’s rights and obligations of 
EU membership as possible. 
It is unclear whether a transition on these terms can be based on Article 50 TEU.  The EU 
institutions appear to assume that this is possible.58  Yet unless confirmed by the Court of 
Justice there is no absolute legal certainty on this point.59 
The following discussion suggests that Article 50 (2) TEU can be used as a legal basis for 
such a transitional arrangement, but that there are certain limits to this.  This means that a 
transitional arrangement can be concluded as part of the withdrawal agreement. 
Nonetheless, any transition deal would still imply certain changes to the status quo.  It 
means in particular that if the UK is no longer a Member State, it will no longer be able to 
participate in the EU’s institutional framework and decision-making processes.  Further 
details – apart from saying that the status quo should continue – will need therefore to be 
set out in the withdrawal agreement. 
To provide further examples, these additional details might concern the extent of the 
continued role of the European Commission in monitoring compliance with EU law and 
enforcing it if necessary; the continued jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, in particular the 
right (and sometimes duty) of UK courts request preliminary rulings from it; the basis for 
calculating the UK’s budgetary contributions during transition; access of UK-based 
individuals, businesses and other bodies to EU funding schemes; under what conditions – if 
at all – the UK would participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy; and whether 
the UK would be allowed to negotiate its own free trade agreements even if they could not 
enter into force until the end of the transition period.60 
A further decision that would need to be made would be whether the transition should be 
used to gradually phase out UK participation in various policy areas.  For instance, in areas 
which an agreement about the future relationship will not cover, such as participation in the 
EU’s regional (or cohesion) policy with its structural funds, a cessation of the UK’s 
participation may not prejudice the contents of the future relationship, so that an earlier exit 
would not raise many issues.   
As pointed out above, Article 50 TEU is an unusual competence for the EU as it allows it to 
conclude an agreement dealing with all issues of withdrawal of a Member State.  It is 
                                            
58 See e.g. the joint report of 8 December 2017 (fn. 27) para 96, which speaks of ‘an overall agreement under 
Article 50 on the UK’s withdrawal […] including an agreement as early as possible in 2018 on transitional 
arrangements.’ 
59 On the ECJ’s role in reviewing EU agreements, see above; doubts about the appropriateness of Article 50 
TEU as a legal basis for transition are voiced e.g. by Armstrong  (fn. 13) page 5. 
60 Further examples can be found in Armstrong (fn. 13) pages 7-8. 
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therefore not necessary for the EU to point to a specific external competence for each and 
every aspect of the withdrawal agreement.  This implies, however, that the use of Article 50 
TEU is strictly limited to ‘setting out the arrangements for [the UK’s] withdrawal’ as 
otherwise the EU’s limited powers in the sphere of external relations and the Member 
States’ rights of participation might be undermined.   
It is suggested, however, that legal arrangements allowing for a smooth (and possibly 
phased) transition from membership to non-membership are covered by the wording of 
Article 50 (2) TEU.  The test developed by the Court of Justice in this regard is whether the 
content of the agreement concluded is covered by the ‘essential object’ of the legal 
competence found in the Treaties.61  As Armstrong has pointed out, one could conceive of 
the essential object of Article 50 TEU in a narrow manner covering only the withdrawal 
itself.62  Yet it is submitted here that a broader reading should be favoured.  By expressly 
requiring the withdrawal agreement to take account for the framework for the departing 
Member State’s future relations, the object and purpose of Article 50 TEU aims to ensure a 
smooth exit of that Member State, which transitional arrangements would favour.  Hence 
there is a strong argument that a transitional arrangement that aims to achieve exactly that 
could be based on Article 50 (2) TEU. 
At the same time, the use of Article 50 TEU has its limits.  As pointed out above, this means 
in particular that it cannot be used as the basis for the future relationship between the EU 
and the UK.  This implies that it must not pre-determine the outcome of any agreement 
concerning the future relationship between the EU and the UK.  It also suggests that that 
any transitional arrangement – especially if based on the status quo – must be time-limited.  
The maximum possible duration of a transition is not clearly defined anywhere in the 
Treaties, but a transition of more than five years might be considered problematic.   
Thus an extension of the transition period – once agreed – might become difficult.  If, for 
instance, a two-year transition were agreed in the withdrawal agreement, and in 2021 the 
EU and the UK realised that they would need more time to negotiate a future relationship 
agreement, there might be limits to the use of Article 50 (2) TEU to amend the withdrawal 
agreement accordingly.  There are the inherent time limits pointed out in the preceding 
paragraph. But there would be the additional question of whether Article 50 TEU could be 
used at all given that at that point the UK would no longer be a Member State and Article 50 
TEU can only be used as the basis for an agreement between the EU and a present 
Member State that wishes to depart.  A solution to this problem would be the inclusion of an 
express clause permitting the extension of the transitional period. 
 
 
                                            
61 Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:461, para 39. 
62 See Armstrong (fn. 13) page 6. 
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There is a further practical limit to what Article 50 TEU – or any other basis in EU law – can 
achieve.  As it is an agreement between the EU and the UK only, it cannot be binding on 
third states.63  This means that once the UK has left the EU, it will no longer be 
automatically covered by international agreements concluded by the EU alone.  In addition, 
it is doubtful that the UK would be covered by so-called mixed agreements concluded 
between the EU and its Member States on one side and a third country on the other.   
These agreements, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
the EU and Canada, are bilateral in nature and most of their provisions cannot in practice 
apply between the third country and an ex-Member State.  The same goes for the UK’s 
membership of the European Economic Area.64  Hence if the UK wanted to trade under 
these agreements during the transition period, it would need to ensure that it continues to 
be bound by these agreements.  This would need to be done by way of bilateral agreements 
between the UK and the countries concerned.  This it may not always be easy politically as 
these agreements are the outcome of long and complex negotiations and constitute 
package deals and compromises reached in a very specific policy context.65 
A transition could conceivably be achieved by a separate treaty concluded between the EU 
and the UK providing for a bespoke arrangement, i.e. not the continuation of the status quo.  
For instance, both sides could agree a special ‘transitional arrangement treaty’.  Such a 
bespoke arrangement might, however, take as much time to negotiate as the future 
relationship.  It might also mean the introduction of new rules governing EU-UK relations, 
which would in itself require government, businesses, and individuals to adapt.  Both of 
these considerations would thus run counter to the overall purpose of a transition. Given the 
time-pressure that negotiators are already under, a bespoke transitional arrangement 
deviating from the status quo does therefore not seem realistic.   
An alternative would be for the UK to temporarily re-join EFTA and thus remain in the 
European Economic Area, which would in essence continue the UK’s participation in the 
single market.  However, apart from not being covered by the European Council’s 
guidelines and requiring the consent of the other EFTA countries, such a solution would in 
all likelihood lead to a cliff-edge in particular in customs terms and other forms of 
cooperation, e.g. in matters of agriculture or criminal justice, which would need to be 
negotiated separately.  Furthermore, it would have the practical disadvantage of requiring to 
                                            
63 This is a general principle of international law, which can be found in Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It says: ‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent’. 
64 On this agreement specifically, see Panos Koutrakos, ‘Brexit and European Economic Area membership’ 
(2017) 42 European Law Review, 617-618. 
65 Panos Koutrakos, ‘Negotiating international trade treaties after Brexit’, (2016) 41 European Law Review 
475, 476. 
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be negotiated separately with great effort only to be abandoned a few years later for the 
final future agreement. Hence it would not appear to be a realistic option either.66 
If a status quo transition is negotiated, this will require the UK (and the EU) to take the 
necessary steps internally to make the transition work.  A status quo transition would in 
particular require the UK to continue to accept that EU law has primacy over conflicting 
domestic law including Acts of Parliament;67 that EU law can have direct effect, i.e. be 
directly relied upon by individuals without prior domestic implementation;68 that UK courts 
would still be entitled to request preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice;69 and, if the 
UK agrees to be implement new EU legislation passed during the transition period, a legal 
basis for doing so.70 
The UK follows a dualist tradition, which means that international treaties do not 
automatically have effect internally, but only if there is an Act of Parliament incorporating 
them into domestic law.  As far as EU law is concerned, this function is performed by the 
European Communities Act 1972.  Key provisions are s. 2 (1), which makes EU law directly 
enforceable in domestic courts; s. 2 (2), which provides the basis for implementing EU 
Directives by way of secondary legislation; s. 2 (4) which is the basis for the recognition of 
the doctrine of primacy of EU law over UK law, including Acts of Parliament; and s. 3, which 
recognises the role of the Court of Justice to interpret EU law in an authoritative manner. 
The key difficulty in giving effect to a transitional agreement is that according to clause 1 of 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed 
on exit day (presumably 29 March 2017).  Hence at the point in time the transitional 
arrangement would enter into force, there would be no provision providing for the necessary 
effects of EU law in domestic law.  Admittedly, even if the European Communities Act 1972 
remained in force, it would need to be amended to reflect the changes brought about by the 
transitional arrangement.71  After all, that Act specifically refers to the EU Treaties, which 
after Brexit would no longer apply to the UK and thus no longer have any effects.72 
This means that domestic implementation of the transitional arrangement will become 
necessary.  One option is to do this by way of statute, i.e. an Act of Parliament – whose 
effects might be time-limited – with similar content to the European Communities Act 1972.   
                                            
66 These options are discussed – but equally dismissed as unrealistic – in some more detail in See Armstrong 
(fn. 13) pages 12-13. 
67 Established in the case law of the Court of Justice since 1964, see Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL 
ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 and accepted by the House of Lords since the decision in Regina v Secretary of State for 
Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 (HL). 
68 Established in the case law of the Court of Justice since 1963, see Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en 
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 
and accepted by the House of Lords in Factortame (fn 67). 
69 Currently possible under the terms of the European Communities Act 1972. 
70 Also currently provided for by the European Communities Act 1972. 
71 For some of the finer points on this see: Kenneth Armstrong, John Bell, Paul Daly, Mark Elliott, 
‘Implementing Transition: How Would it Work?’ CELS/CLP Working Paper, October 2017, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3052328.  
72 To this effect see R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
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According to the joint report of 8 December 2017, the UK Government will introduce a 
‘Withdrawal Agreement & Implementation Bill’ into Parliament.  As there is currently no 
agreement on the transition, the joint report does not mention the contents of the Bill in that 
regard.  But it does say that with regard to the rights of EU citizens living in the UK, it will 
ensure that ‘the citizens' rights Part [of the withdrawal agreement] will have effect in primary 
legislation and will prevail over inconsistent or incompatible legislation, unless Parliament 
expressly repeals this Act in future.’  This means that it will aim to replicate the effects that 
EU law has at present.  
An implementation such as this is not guaranteed to achieve the desired aims.  This is 
because the transitional arrangement will be a novelty in European and international law.  
While it might expressly stipulate that EU law should continue to have primacy and direct 
effect in the UK, there is no guarantee that the Court of Justice and domestic courts will 
consider this to be the same effects that EU law currently has as it applies by virtue of the 
EU Treaties.  There is in particular no guarantee that the UK courts will accept it in the 
same manner as they do while the UK is still a member of the EU.  After all, a key argument 
in favour of recognising the full effects of EU law in the UK at the time of the leading 
Factortame case was that primacy ‘was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the [Union]’.73  This justification 
might not be easily transferrable to similar rules in a transitional arrangement. 
Apart from a continued operation of the clauses now contained in the European 
Communities Act 1972, the domestic implementation of transition will require further 
changes to UK law.  The entry into force of certain provisions of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill would need to be deferred, e.g. the rules on the incorporation of ‘retained 
EU law’ into domestic law.  This deferral could be probably be achieved on the basis of 
clause 17.74   
A further change would need to be made to the devolved statutes, in particular the Scotland 
Act where either ss 29 and 57 themselves would need to be amended or the definition of 
‘EU law’ under s. 126 (9) of the Act would need to be changed.  At the same time, the 
changes to s. 29 envisaged by clause 11 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill would 
need to be deferred.  Furthermore, the Withdrawal Agreement & Implementation Bill might 
trigger legislative consent motions in the devolved legislatures. 
  
                                            
73 Factortame (fn 67) per Lord Bridge. 
74 See Armstrong/Bell/Daly/Elliott (fn. 71). 
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As pointed out before, Article 50 (2) TEU envisages that – apart from the conditions of 
withdrawal – the UK and the EU will come to an agreement on a future relationship.  For the 
reasons stated above, it is unlikely that the Court of Justice would accept that such a 
relationship can be based on Article 50 TEU.  Instead it must be founded on other 
competence norms scattered throughout the Treaties.  The EU possesses many external 
competences both expressly laid down in the Treaties and implied competences that flow 
from the exercise of competences to legislate within the EU.75  The most important 
competences for the purposes of a future relationship deal are those pertaining to the 
common commercial policy, i.e. an exclusive competence to conclude free trade 
agreements;76 the competence to conclude association agreements;77 cooperation with 
third countries on research on its research programmes;78 fisheries;79 matters of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy;80 and some aspects of Justice and Home Affairs.81 
The Union’s ability to conclude one or more agreements dealing with the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU is therefore limited by the principle of conferred powers.  If the 
future relationship touches on competences resting with the Member States – such as 
certain aspects of immigration (e.g. work visa for non-EU nationals; Member States’ own 
nationals’ rights to family reunification with non-EU nationals); political or cultural dialogues; 
healthcare and others – any international treaty envisaged by the EU and the UK must also 
be concluded by the Member States.  These so-called mixed agreements are a commonly 
used instrument in EU external relations.   
The legal justification for mixed agreements is a lack of competence of the EU to conclude 
the agreement alone.  Member States, however, are known to have insisted on mixed 
agreements even where these would not have been strictly necessary.  As Eeckhout notes: 
‘at the political level in the EU there is a tendency to consider that, unless an agreement 
falls wholly within the exclusive competence of the EU, mixity is required’.82 
Mixed agreements must be concluded and ratified not only by the EU according to the 
procedures set out in the Treaties, but additionally by each Member State according to their 
own constitutional rules.  This requires the approval of the national parliament in many 
Member States. Some Member States may have additional requirements, in particular the 
                                            
75 So-called implied powers, see Articles 3 (2) and 216 TFEU. 
76 Article 207 TFEU. 
77 Article 217 TFEU. 
78 Article 186 TFEU. 
79 Flows from Articles 3 (1)(e) and 4 (2)(d) as well as Article 3 (2) TFEU. 
80 Article 37 TEU. 
81 Such as Article 79 (3) TFEU (readmission of third country nationals who do not or no longer fulfil the 
conductions for entry, presence or residence); and implied powers. 
82 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011) 214. 
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need for approval by regional parliaments.83  In addition, a mixed agreement may be 
challenged before national constitutional courts.84  Hence mixed agreements are more 
difficult to negotiate and take longer to ratify than EU-only agreements. 
As a rule of thumb, the more ambitious and comprehensive the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU is intended to become, the more likely it is that the Union may have to 
proceed by way of a mixed agreement.85  
In order to speed up negotiations and reduce the risk of failure, the EU and the UK might 
choose to conclude a number of separate future relationship agreements rather than one 
comprehensive treaty.  This would have the advantage of enabling both parties to put into 
effect a basic agreement – e.g. on free trade – relatively quickly and negotiate other forms 
of cooperation later.  It would also have a procedural advantage: by dividing up the issues 
along the lines of the EU’s external competences, the need for mixed agreements can be 
reduced; furthermore the Union may – in some instances – be able to conclude the 
agreement with a Council decision adopted by qualified majority – and not unanimity.86   
At the same time, the EU is keen not to replicate its relationship with Switzerland, which is 
governed by more than 100 bilateral agreements.  Hence if the approach of negotiating 
more than one agreement is pursued, it is likely that there will still only be a handful of 
agreements and that all agreements will be subjected to a common institutional framework. 
According to the European Council’s guidelines of 15 December 2017, the Council is not 
expected to issue negotiating directives on the future relationship before March 2018.87  It is 
therefore difficult to predict what precisely the future relationship will look like. There are 
some indicators as to what each side prefers, however.  The Prime Minister’s Florence 
speech suggested that the UK regards an economic partnership – which would be 
‘comprehensive and ambitious’, but would see the UK leave the single market and the 
customs union – and a security partnership as central.88  The EU side made clear that it 
would aim to preserve a level playing field and the integrity of the single market – and thus 
not allow any ‘cherry picking’ when it comes to the four freedoms of the single market (free 
movement of goods, people, services, and capital).89  According to the EU’s chief negotiator 
the ‘no cherry picking’ approach extends also to cooperation in the field of security.  He said 
                                            
83 This is e.g. the case in Belgium, where the refusal of the Walloon parliament to ratify CETA delayed its 
entry into force. 
84 As happened with regard to CETA e.g. in France and Germany.  
85 It should be noted that Denmark (Protocol 22 of the Lisbon Treaty) and Ireland (Protocol 21 providing for 
opt-ins) have opt-outs from the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which may require a partially 
mixed agreement if these two countries were to be included in a future relationship deal concerning the AFSJ 
which would cover them. 
86 See Article 218 (8) TFEU. 
87 See European Council (fn. 32) para 9. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See European Council Guidelines, fn 17, para 1 and European Council (fn. 32) para 7; participation in the 
single market would also include acceptance of ECJ oversight, see Jean-Claude Piris, ‘Britain is deluding 
itself over single market access’, Financial Times, 16 November 2016, www.ft.com/content/7a3d13ee-cabf-
11e7-8536-d321d0d897a3.  
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in a recent speech: ‘A third country, however close it may be to the Union, may not lay 
claim to a status that is equivalent or superior to that of a Member of the Union’.90   
The institutional framework governing the enforcement and interpretation of the agreement 
will depend on how ambitious it is. 
The governance arrangements for questions pertaining to the rights of EU citizens living in 
the UK as agreed in the joint report of 8 December 2017 might give an idea of what can be 
expected in this regard for the future relationship.  The arrangements mainly concern the 
enforcement of the agreement in the UK and the EU-27.   
To this end they give the UK Government and the European Commission the right to 
intervene in relevant cases before the ECJ and before the UK courts respectively. 
They further envisage an independent authority in the UK that will ensure that the UK is 
acting in conformity with its obligations under the withdrawal agreement.  The Commission 
would continue performing an equivalent role with regard to the EU. 
They also provide that UK courts must have ‘due regard’ to relevant ECJ case law and – for a 
time-limited period – allow them to request preliminary rulings from the ECJ. 
Furthermore, the joint report foresees – as far as the coordination of social security systems 
is concerned – ‘a mechanism […] to decide jointly on the incorporation of future 
amendments to those regulations in the Withdrawal Agreement.’  
What follows is based on the assumption that close trading relations will be central to both 
the EU’s and the UK’s ideas about future mutual relations.  Hence the discussion will 
contain reflections on trade, i.e. how customs and non-tariff barriers to trade (in particular 
regulatory differences) would be dealt with.  Further policy areas that one or more 
agreements on a future relationship might include are: cooperation on security matters, 
both internal (policing) and external (defence);91 cooperation between universities (research 
funding and exchanges); cooperation in judicial matters (recognition and enforcement of 
judgments; extradition, etc); cooperation on matters of the environment and climate change; 
and others. 
The following outline focuses on the legal aspects of the various options open to the EU 
and the UK, in particular their legal bases in the EU Treaties and the procedures under 
which they would be adopted.  
                                            
90 Speech by Michel Barnier at the Berlin Security Conference, 29 November 2017, SPEECH/17/5021, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-5021_en.htm.  
91 In her Florence speech (fn. 2) the Prime Minister mentioned mass migration and terrorism as shared 
challenges in this regard. 
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There is a wide spectrum of possible cooperation between the UK and the EU after Brexit.  
This ranges from a no-deal Brexit, which would leave relations based on general 
international law and residually applicable treaties between the UK and various EU Member 
States with trade relations on WTO terms, to participation in many key EU policies, notably 
the single market and the customs union.  The no-deal scenario does not warrant further 
discussion here as it is currently not desired by either side and it does not require further 
mutual legal steps to be taken other than perhaps ensuring the UK’s independent 
participation in the WTO.92 
As for negotiated relationships, the only off-the-shelf model is membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA; the ‘Norway model’) as this is an already negotiated multilateral 
treaty, to which the UK could accede provided that it becomes a member of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) and provided that all EEA members, i.e. three EFTA 
countries, the EU, and its remaining Member States, agree.  All other options – be it a free 
trade agreement (the ‘Canada model’), an association agreement (the ‘Ukraine model’) or a 
set of bilateral agreements replicating much of the single market (the ‘Swiss model’) – 
cannot simply be picked off the shelf.93  Instead, each one of these relationships would be 
negotiated from the start and while the EU-UK deal is likely to resemble one of them in 
terms of its basic contents, it will almost certainly differ in detail.  
No matter which avenue is pursued, timing is likely to be an issue.  It is unlikely that any 
future relationship agreement can be agreed and ratified before the 29 March 2019.  Even if 
the withdrawal treaty contains a fairly detailed agreement about the ‘framework for a future 
relationship’, the detailed negotiations will take time.  The more the UK’s relationship will 
deviate from established models, the more time it will take.  Additionally, any parallels 
drawn between the following models and the EU-UK relationship must be treated with 
caution: all of these treaties were concluded to remove existing barriers to trade.  The EU-
UK relationship will – almost inevitably – require negotiations about the erection of new 
barriers.  This is unprecedented.  It is unlikely that this difference will necessarily make 
negotiations easier or much quicker.  Furthermore, as both sides desire – and as the law 
requires – that the transitional period will be time-limited, the negotiators will again operate 
in a ‘ticking clock-scenario’ as is presently the case with the negotiation of the withdrawal 
agreement. 
In addition, the mere fact that there currently exists regulatory equivalence and tariff-free 
trade between the EU27 and the UK does not mean that an agreement covering their future 
relationship will not need to contain rules governing these matters in the future.  It can be 
assumed that the EU will be particularly keen to avoid a situation where the UK can adopt 
lower regulatory standards, e.g. in the field of environmental protection, without the EU 
being in a position to react.94  Hence the EU might insist on the inclusion of rights to 
                                            
92 On the consequences of a no deal scenario, see House of Lords EU Committee, ‘Brexit: deal or no deal’ HL 
Paper 46 of 7 December 2017, available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/46/46.pdf.   
93 On the various options in more detail see SPICe briefing 16/78, ‘Options for the United Kingdom’s future 
trading relationship with the European Union’, available at: 
www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-
78_Options_for_the_United_Kingdoms_future_trading_relationship_with_the_European_Union.pdf.  
94 Similar concerns might obviously exist in the UK, e.g. with regard to animal welfare standards. 
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retaliate in such a case.95  Retaliatory measures are a common instrument in international 
trade, including under the WTO, and usually consist in punitive tariffs on certain products.96  
This is only one of many issues over which there may not be agreement from the outset.  
There will be many difficult questions to be negotiated, which is time-consuming and 
reinforces the practical need for a transition period. 
The most basic future relationship would consist in a free trade agreement.  The EU has an 
exclusive competence over the common commercial policy according to Article 207 TFEU 
and has concluded numerous agreements with third countries on this basis.  Traditionally, 
such agreements have dealt with the removal or reduction of customs tariffs and of non-
tariff barriers to trade in goods and services.  These matters are covered by the Union’s 
exclusive competence. 
The ‘new generation’ of free trade agreements negotiated and concluded by the EU – such 
as the agreements with Singapore and Canada (CETA) – are more ambitious and cover 
additional matters related to trade, such as the protection of intellectual property and foreign 
investment, access to public procurement and matters of competition law.  The Court of 
Justice recently held that most of these matters fall within the EU’s exclusive competence 
under Article 207 TFEU with the exception of investment that is not direct (e.g. portfolio 
investment) and investor-state dispute settlement.97  Hence an agreement between the EU 
and the UK that contained a chapter on investor-state dispute settlement would need to be 
concluded as a mixed agreement.  Non-direct foreign investment, by contrast, is covered by 
a shared EU competence, which the EU can exercise alone.98   
It is therefore legally possible for the EU to conclude a fairly comprehensive free trade 
agreement as an EU-only agreement, but as noted above there is a tendency in practice 
that Member States insist on agreements being concluded as mixed agreements for 
political reasons. 
A free trade agreement such as this would allow the UK to conclude its own free trade 
deals with other countries and trading blocs.  In terms of content it could be used to keep 
customs duties at zero – as is presently the case – and to make it easier to deal with 
regulatory differences.  However, the example of CETA – the most ambitions EU trade 
agreement yet99 – shows that despite a free trade agreement regulatory divergences are 
liable to remain an obstacle to trade, in particular in the field of services.  For instance, 
unlike the provisions governing the single market, CETA does not contain rules on mutual 
recognition – except for the recognition of professional qualifications – and thus it does not 
                                            
95 The European Commission’s deputy chief negotiator Sabine Weyand was recently quoted in the press as 
having called for this as an option, see The Guardian, 1 December 2017, ‘Brussels may include 'punishment 
clause' in post-Brexit trade deal’ available at: www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/01/brussels-
punishment-clause-uk-trade-deal-regulatory-standards-brexit.   
96 In the article, Sabine Weyand mentioned British beef exports as a possible target. 
97 See Opinion 2/15 Singapore FTA ECLI:EU:C:2017:376. 
98 This has now been clarified by the Court of Justice in Case C-600/14 Germany v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:935, paras 67-68. 
99 It inter alia contains chapters on market access for good; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures; cross border trade in services; mutual recognition of professional qualifications; 
financial services; intellectual property, etc. 
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give passporting rights to financial service providers.100  Hence both Canada and the EU 
can maintain their regulatory requirements for service providers so long as they are not 
discriminatory.  While CETA provides for ambitious regulatory cooperation in chapter 21, 
that cooperation remains largely voluntary.101  It will remain to be seen how this to-date 
largely experimental cooperation will operate in practice.102 
The example of CETA also points to a further legal constraint for the EU.  When negotiating 
an agreement on the future relationship with the UK, it must be mindful of its wider network 
of international obligations.  CETA serves as a poignant example.  It contains a clause 
according to which the EU and Canada must grant most-favoured nation status to each 
other in the highly regulated field of services.103  It means that each party must treat service 
suppliers of the other party no less favourably than it treats service suppliers of any other 
country.  This has potential implications for the future relationship between the EU and the 
UK: if that agreement treated the UK more favourably than Canada (and other EU trade 
partners, such as South Korea), the EU would have to accord the same favourable 
treatment to them.104  Hence concessions made to the UK in the field of services have 
wider implications for the EU and might therefore incentivise it not to liberalise trade on 
certain matters.  Similar limitations arise from the EU’s and the UK’s membership of the 
WTO, which, for instance, requires that a free trade agreement – in order to be recognised 
as such and thus result in an exception to the ‘most favoured nation’ principle – must cover 
‘substantially all the trade’ between them.105  The EU institutions seem to be mindful of this.  
The European Council’s guidelines of 15 December 2017 expressly highlight that it wishes 
to ‘avoid upsetting existing relations with other third countries’.   
In procedural terms, agreements concluded under Article 207 TFEU are approved by the 
Council with a qualified majority, unless they also cover trade in services or intellectual 
property or foreign direct investment, in which case unanimity is required.  It is highly 
probable that a UK-EU free trade agreement would regulate the latter aspects of trade as 
well, so that all Member States will be required to approve the agreement in the Council.  If 
the agreement contains a ‘specific institutional framework by organisation cooperation 
procedures’ – which in an ambitious trade agreement will be inevitable – the consent of the 
European Parliament is also necessary. 
A free trade agreement could be supplemented by cooperation in the other areas outlined 
above.  This could either be achieved as part of one overall agreement or by way of 
separately negotiated treaties.   
Article 218 TFEU provides for the procedure for most types of cooperation in this regard.  
Normally the Council would need to approve an agreement by way of qualified majority and 
the European Parliament would need to be informed, unless one of the exceptions laid 
down in Article 218 (6) (a) TFEU applies.  Again, it should be pointed out that if one 
comprehensive agreement is concluded that deals with more forms of cooperation than 
                                            
100 Passporting would allow a financial service provider established and licensed in the UK can offer its 
services in the EU27 without having to be based there and obtaining an operating license from one of the 
EU27 countries.  
101 See Article 21.2 (6) of CETA; more in Elaine Fahey, ‘CETA and Global Governance Law: What Kind of A 
Model Agreement Is It Really in Law?’ (2017) 2 European Papers, 293, 298. 
102 Fahey, ibid,  
103 Article 9.5 of CETA. 
104 There is an exception in Article 9.5 (3) CETA for recognition clauses. 
105 Article XXIV (8) (b) GATT. 
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trade, there is an increased likelihood that not all aspects are covered by an EU 
competence so that it would need to be concluded as a mixed agreement. 
Article 217 TFEU contains a competence for the EU to conclude ‘agreements establishing 
an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedure’.  The Union has concluded a number of these so-called association agreements 
with third countries.  The wording of Article 217 TFEU suggests that they are meant to 
create a closer relationship between the EU and the third country than a mere trade 
agreement.  In the words of the Court of Justice, ‘an association agreement [creates] 
special, privileged links with a non-member country’106 and suggests that it is not sufficient 
for an association if an agreement ‘is intended essentially to promote the economic 
development of the [the third country] and that, to that end, it confines itself to establishing a 
form of cooperation between the Contracting Parties which is not aimed at securing that 
country's association with [the EU].’107  
According to the ECJ’s Advocate General Ruiz Colomer, association agreements ‘have four 
main objectives: to prepare for membership of the European Union, to offer an alternative to 
membership, to establish a programme of cooperation in order to aid development and to 
promote inter-regional assistance’.108  
The Lisbon Treaty formally recognises the importance of the EU’s immediate 
neighbourhood and obliges the Union and its Member States to ‘establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised 
by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.’109  The main tool for achieving the 
aims of this neighbourhood policy are association agreements. 
As the EU-UK relationship will aim to constitute an alternative to EU membership and will 
be between the Union and one of its closest neighbours, both sides might therefore pursue 
the route of an association agreement.  However, an association agreement would typically 
be concluded in order to bring a non-Member State close to the EU’s rulebook (the so-
called EU acquis).  According to the wording of Article 217 TFEU, association agreements 
must provide for ‘common action and special procedure’.  Like free trade agreements 
concluded by the EU, the content of association agreements differs considerably in 
practice.110   
In terms of competence, Article 217 TFEU gives the EU an exclusive competence to 
conclude such agreements ‘in all fields covered by the Treaties.’111  Nonetheless, most 
association agreements have been concluded as mixed agreements, chiefly because they 
tend to include an element of political dialogue. 
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109 Article 8 TEU. 
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A recent example of an association agreement is that between the EU and Ukraine.112  As 
part of the EU’s eastern partnership, it has obviously been concluded in a very different 
political environment to Brexit.113  At the same time, it basically consist of a ‘free trade 
agreement plus’ and creates a ‘deep and comprehensive free trade area’114.  It covers all 
areas of trade including services and provides for regulatory alignment with the EU.  It was 
concluded as a mixed agreement. 
Like all association agreements, it contains an institutional framework.  The institutional 
framework serves to maintain the association between the EU and the third country.115  In 
case of the EU-Ukraine agreement that framework consists features annual summit 
meetings, an association council at the ministerial level, association committees (at the 
technical level and created by the association council), a joint parliamentary committee, and 
a dispute settlement mechanism.  The association council (and the committees if the 
association council so decrees) can make binding decisions unanimously.  This means that 
association agreements tend to be dynamic and can develop without the need for treaty 
amendments.  They can in particular result in close regulatory alignment with EU rules. 
Depending on whether such a dynamism and openness for development is desired by both 
sides, an association agreement might be appropriate.   
In practice, the differences between an association agreement and a free trade agreement 
can be small as ambitious trade agreements often provide for institutions as well.  The main 
difference tends to be that the decisions of the institutions of an association agreement are 
binding on the parties whereas the decisions under a free trade agreement are mere 
recommendations.116   
Moreover, not all agreements concluded by the EU using Article 217 TFEU as their legal 
basis are given the designation ‘association agreement.’  This may be to avoid the 
impression that there is an imbalance in status between the EU and its third country 
partner, which would appear to be an inherent feature of association agreements.117  For 
instance, the bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland were concluded on the 
basis of Article 217 TFEU.118  However, the EU is not keen to replicate the Swiss model 
with the UK as it might consider it to run counter to its ‘no cherry picking’ approach and, 
even if that did not stand in the way, the EU would want to wrap it into an overall 
institutional framework.119 
                                            
112 Its use as a model for a future EU-UK association agreement is promoted by Duff (fn. 16).  
113 On the Eastern Partnership more generally, see Balas Jarabik and Dovile Sukite, ‘Eight Years of Eastern 
Partnership: Hidden in the Trenches’ available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/23/eight-years-of-
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114 For details see European Commission, ‘EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ available 
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115 Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution (CUP 2014) 464. 
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In terms of procedure, association agreements require the consent of the European 
Parliament and unanimity in the Council.120  Furthermore, most association agreements are 
concluded as mixed agreements.  
The final option for the UK would be to re-join EFTA and remain in the EEA.  This 
constitutes the only existing pre-defined relationship in terms of trade of which the UK could 
avail itself.  Accession to EFTA is possible according to Article 56 EFTA Convention with 
the approval of the EFTA Council.  EFTA membership is a pre-condition for membership of 
the EEA for non-EU members.121  
EEA membership would keep the UK in the single market and this would mean that the UK 
would have to accept the free movement of persons.  It would also require the UK to keep 
up with the EU acquis and thus reduce its ability to adopt different regulatory standards in 
many areas.  It is therefore unlikely to constitute the UK’s preferred choice given that the 
Prime Minister was clear in her Florence speech that the UK ‘will no longer be members of 
its single market or its customs union’.122 
EEA membership would not include membership of the EU’s customs union.  It would also 
not entail other forms of cooperation, e.g. on security. All of these would need to be 
negotiated individually, for which there is precedent in the past. For instance Norway is part 
of the Schengen agreement and also there is an agreement in place similar to the 
European Arrest Warrant.123 
 
 
                                            
120 See Article 218 (6) and (8) TFEU. 
121 For details see SPICe briefing SB17-41 ‘European Economic Area Membership’, available at: https://sp-
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